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An Overview Of Export Controls on Transfer of
Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Soviet
Intervention in Afghanistan
At President Carter's direction the Secretary of Commerce sus-
pended existing licenses and barred the issuance of new licenses to ship
high technology commodities and to transfer technical data to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics effective January 11, 1980.' Although the
United States has controlled high technology exports to the Soviet Union
in the past because of their potential military applicability, President
Carter has used the Export Administration Act of 19792 to declare the
current embargo for a different foreign policy purpose. The embargo is
designed to hurt the Soviet Union's industrial modernization efforts in
hopes of persuading it to withdraw its military troops from Afghanistan
and to show that the United States will not idly stand by when such
military intervention occurs.3 Thus, while the use of export controls on
1 45 Fed. Reg. 3027 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 390.6). The regulation provides
in part:
(a) All validated licenses, reexport authorizations (15 C.F.R. § 374), and parts
and components authorizations (15 C.F.R. § 376.12) for shipment of any com-
modities or transfer of technical data (15 C.F.R. § 379) to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) are suspended. This suspension includes shipments
under special bulk licenses described in Part 373 to the extent they authorize
shipment of commodities to the U.S.S.R. Except as described in the Savings
Clause, no exports or reexports may be made against such suspended licenses or
authorizations without further approval from the Office of Export Administra-
tion. This order does not affect any agricultural commodities or products made
subject to validated licensing pursuant to § 376.5 of these regulations.
(b) Savtigs Clause. Shipments of any commodity or technical data previously au-
thorized for shipment to the U.S.S.R. by a validated license or authorization as
described in paragraph (a) of this section, that were on dock, on lighter, laden
aboard any exporting carrier, or in transit to a port of exit pursuant to actual
orders for export prior to 12 noon EST January 11, 1980 may be exported under
that validated license or authorization up to 12 noon EST January 13, 1980. Any
such shipment not exported before 12 noon January 13, 1980 may not be shipped
to the U.S.S.R. without further authorization from the Office of Export Adminis-
tration . . . .
Id at 3029. See also Interpretation of Technical Data Regulations, id. at 20,071 (to be codified
in 15 C.F.R. § 379, Supp. No. 2); id. at 37,415 (revising policy on exports to Afghanistan).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-72 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420). See text
accompanying notes 65-75 in fa.
3 President Carter has brought other foreign policy weapons to bear on the Soviet Union
in response to its invasion of Afghanistan. Besides the high technology embargo considered in
this note, he cancelled surplus grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). The
United States also boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. See TIME, Aug. 4, 1980,
at 28-33.
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technology as a foreign policy weapon is not new, this latest action offers
an opportunity to review U.S. statutory controls on technology exports
with a focus on the Soviet Union in order to put Carter's action in histor-
ical as well as legal perspective.
This note will first discuss the facts of the current embargo. Then, a
brief history of Soviet need for foreign technology, a catalogue of U.S.
law governing the transfer of such technology, and a discussion of U.S.
policy objectives regarding transfer of technology to the Soviet Union
will provide the context in which the recent ban on sales will be consid-
ered and analyzed.
The principal items that have been affected by President Carter's
technology embargo are computers and related equipment, automobiles,
communications, chemicals, lasers, microprocessing equipment, and oil
and gas drilling equipment. 4 Regarding the economic impact of the em-
bargo, the New York Times reported White House Press Secretary Jody
Powell as stating:
Last year, the United States exported about $400 million worth of such
products and associated technology to the Soviet Union. Mr. Powell
contended, however, that the relatively small value of those sales, com-
pared with total American exports, was far less important than the po-
tential consequences for the Soviet Union, which is trying to expand and
modernize its productive capacities.
5
Thus, the Carter Administration has determined that the embargo is
worth the price that it may cost in lost exports.
President Carter further sought to coordinate the high technology
embargo with allied nations to ensure that it is worth the sacrifice and to
stem the fears of businessmen and others that the embargo would not be
effective if foreign firms picked up U.S. contracts that are lost.6 Euro-
pean allies at a NATO meeting of January 16, 1980, agreed "not to un-
4 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 18, col. 2 (computers, metalurgical sciences, automobiles,
communications, and chemicals); Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 3 (computers and related
gear, lasers and microprocessing equipment, and oil and gas drilling equipment). See also 45
Fed. Reg. 29568 (1980) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 385 & 399) (adding lasers, silicon materials,
and other items to the Commodity Control list).
5 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 18, col. 2. Cf Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 3 ("A
Commerce Department spokesman said U.S. exports of 'high technology' products to the Soviet
Union ranged between $150 million and $216 million annually over the past four years. This
was only a fraction of the total U.S. exports to the Soviets, which rose from $1.6 billion to $3
billion during 1976-79.").
6 Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 10, 1980, at 1, col. I ("U.S. State Department officials
expect the Soviet Union within the next few months to launch a major diplomatic and propa-
ganda offensive aimed at breaking Western solidarity."); N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at 18, col. 2
("White House Press Secretary said that the Administration was 'encouraging those who share
our deep concerns' over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan not to take advantage of the
American embargo."); Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 3 ("U.S. government officials say
they're hopeful that U.S. allies will cooperate with the embargo on high technology sales to the
Russians. Friendly countries have 'indicated some willingness to cooperate,' one official said.").
Businessmen have not been fully assured that such coordination will be achieved, however.
For instance, Sperry Univac lost a computer order from the Soviet Union in 1978 when the U.S.
government delayed approval of its export license while Soviet dissidents were being put on trial
in the Soviet Union. A French firm picked up that order, and businessmen believe that the
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dermine or undercut" the U.S. embargoes on grain sales, high
technology exports, and commercial credit to the Soviet Union.7 Such
solidarity was promising; however, the support fell short of an agreement
by the NATO countries to reduce their current level of trading with the
Soviets. Consequently, the effect of the embargo on the Soviet Union
will be essentially that produced by the loss of U.S. technology in this
area.
The Soviets currently view U.S. technology as necessary to their
modernization efforts, but Soviet views on the importation of technology
from capitalist nations and firms varied greatly in the initial part of the
twentieth century and may continue to do so in the future. In the early
1920's, at the time of the "New Economic Policy," the Soviet Union was
increasingly receptive to "mixed companies"" within their industry.9
Mixed companies were seen as necessary for modernization of industry
and business; and, Lenin wrote that at the time, "If we were unable, even
under these circumstances to learn, to supplement what we have learnt
and to complete it, our people would entirely and hopelessly be a nation
of fools."' 0
The government under Stalin's rule, however, viewed such coopera-
tion with foreign enterprises as having served its purpose because it felt
that the socialist elements predominated the economy by that time. The
government viewed joint stock companies, including mixed companies,
as uncritically taken over forms of capitalist administration. Stalin and
the 16th Party Congress believed that although the joint stock companies
were important in the first years of Soviet power, they had outlived their
usefulness. Consequently, in 1930, the 16th Party Congress ordered them
liquidated." I
Although there have been frequent variations of joint ventures in-
same thing will happen to contracts lost or delayed under the current embargo. Wall St. J.,
supra, at 8, col. 4.
7 Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1980, at 1, col. 4. Research has not disclosed evidence of similar
assurances by the Japanese.
8 The term "mixed companies" is used generically to describe companies in the Soviet
Union which have both Soviet and Western ownership or control. These include joint ventures
and companies with joint stock ownership among others.
9 Loeber, Capital Investment in Soviet Enterprises? Possibilities and Limits of LEst- Wst Trade, 6
ADEL. L. REV. 337, 344 (1978).
The charters of mixed companies had to be examined by the Main Concessions
Committee and approved by the Council of the People's Commissars of the
U.S.S.R ..... The Committee was set up in 1922. It was headed by Piatakov
(in 1923), and later by Trotsky (1925-27) and Kamanev (1929-1932). The fate of
these chairmen should not be overlooked as a possible factor in the Soviet debate
on joint-ventures today. Trotsky was exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929 (and
murdered in Mexico in 1941), while Piatakov and Kamanev were sentenced to
death on the charge of 'trotskyist' activities in the show trials of the late thirties
and executed.
Id at 345.
10 33 V. LENIN, SOBRANIE SOCHINENII (COLLECTED WORKS) 420 (4th ed. 1955) (quoted
in Loeber, supra note 9, at 346).
1. Loeber, upra note 9, at 346.
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volving the Soviet Union in third countries since the 1920's,12 the Soviet
Union only again began to emphasize trade as an important tool for
modernizing its economy and as a permanent stimulus for economic
growth and higher productivity in 197 1.1 3 The social benefits of in-
creased trade for the Soviet Union are obvious. Trade with the United
States helps the Soviet Union to gain Western technology, to learn West-
ern methods of management, and to gain access to Western markets.
Trade also enables it to increase exports and to improve its balance of
payments. 14 Currently, the Soviet Union feels a strong need for trade
with tlie United States involving high technology.
The connection between trade and improved political relations be-
tween the two superpowers in the 1960's-1970's is crucial to the renewed
receptive attitude of the Soviets toward trade. In the statement of "Basic
Principles of United States-Soviet Relations," signed in Moscow in 1972,
it was stated that:
The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. regard commercial and economic ties as an
important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral
relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They
will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enter-
prises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements
and contracts, including long-term ones.
15
The Soviets see trade as a significant barometer of the general state of
U.S.-Soviet relations. 16 Increased trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union during the 1970's was a direct result of the warming of
relations between the superpowers up to the time of the Afghanistan in-
vasion. 17
Despite the warming of political relations, the two countries have
had different views as to the mutual benefit of their economic relations.
Whereas the Soviet Union sees trade as a "mutually beneficial" relation-
12 See generally U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET COMMERCIAL OPERA-
TIONS IN THE WEST (1977) (Contract No. ER 77-10486); DIRECTORY OF SOVIET AND EAST
EUROPEAN COMPANIES IN THE WEST (R. Morgan ed. 1978).
13 See BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL, DOING BUSINESS WITH THE USSR 25-34 (1971).
14 Loeber, supra note 9, at 338. Advantages from joint ventures to Western firms include
large profits, overcoming the Soviet shortage of foreign currencies, and access to the Soviet
domestic market with knowledge that labor is cheap and strikes unlikely. Id at 338-39.
For the legal aspects of cooperation with Soviet economic organizations, see Berman, joint
Ventures Between United States Firms and Soviet Economic Organizations, I INT'L TRADE L. J. 139
(1975); Pedersen, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 390 (1975). For a bibli-
ography of Soviet foreign trade law, see Loeber, supra note 9, at 355.
I5 U.S.S.R., BASIC PRINCIPLES OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, Point 7 (May 1972) (quoted
in H. KAHN & W. SCHNEIDER, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY ISSUES IN U.S.-SoVIET TECHNOL-
OGY TRANSFER, at 6-1 (1974) (Dep't of Defense Contract No. DAHC-15-17-C-0274)).
16 Pravda, March 17, 1973. There is a view that detente is but a subterfuge for the Soviets
who need it only for the purpose of gaining additional strength with the help of Western financ-
ing and technology before they launch their next large scale offensive. See Solzhenitsyn, Adoce to
the West, in an "hour of extremity,"TIME, Feb. 18, 1980, at 48-49.
17 The warm relations should not be overstated. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the
Trade Act of 1974, requiring a finding of free emigration before a country could be granted
most favored nation treatment, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1976), chilled trade relations for a time. See
Osofsky, US.-Soviet Trade. Problems and Prospects, 27 MERCER L. REV. 717, 730 (1976).
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ship, the United States has viewed it as an American subsidization of
Soviet industry via trade credits. The U.S. goal has been to develop a
sufficient volume of trade to provide the Soviet Union with a stake in the
continuity of such trade.18 In the process of increasing trade, the United
States as a country has been giving the Soviet Union the benefit of its
comparative advantages, especially in the area of high technology, and
has received little in return from the Soviet Union. The bargain may be
mutually beneficial for the U.S. businesses directly involved in the trans-
fer of technology, but the United States as a whole receives nothing in
return equivalent to the technology transferred. If the United States as a
nation has benefited from the transfer of high technology, it has only
been from the intangible aspects of better relations, a surer understand-
ing of the Russian people, 19 an export-heavy trade balance, and the pos-
sible creation of a Soviet dependency on liberalized trade.
Although the two superpowers disagree as to the equality of their
present trade relationship, historically they have been in step in restrict-
ing trade with one another. The United States has been more liberal in
allowing trade with the Soviet Union in the last ten years than at any
prior time in U.S. history. There have been a myriad of laws providing
for peacetime controls on various exports of technology to the Soviet
Union, other communist countries, and countries where such trade might
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.20 These
controls on technology have varied during the twentieth century in a
manner parallelling the variations in the political climate between the
United States and the Soviet Union. An understanding of the evolution
of such controls and those that are currently applicable will aid interpre-
tation of the recent embargo and estimates of what may follow in its
wake. The acts governing technology export control will be considered in
four groups: those authorizing export controls in times of war and na-
tional emergency, which are administered by the Treasury Department;
those governing arms controls, which are administered by the Defense
and State Departments; those providing for coordination of export con-
trols with allied countries, which are administered by the State Depart-
ment; and those authorizing export controls for foreign policy and
national security purposes, which are administered by the Commerce
Department.
The first legislation authorizing export controls by the President is
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 19 1 7.2 i During periods of war or
18 H. KAHN & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 7-6.
19 Swe Solzhenitsyn, supra note 16.
20 For a discussion of such authority during wartime, see Berman & Garson, United States
Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791 & n.1, 792 (1967).
21 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976) (amended 1977).
The one group of export controls not discussed in this note is that which authorizes the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to control exports of nuclear source materials. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2153-2160 (Supp. 11 1978).
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national emergency, this Act authorizes the President to control all ex-
ports to countries designated as enemies.2 2 It is administered by the
Treasury Department and has been used primarily to supplement the
direct controls over exports issued by the Department of Commerce. 23
The President's authority under the Act is quite broad, and up until
1977 could have been used for purposes unconnected with warfare. The
President would first declare a national emergency; then he would invoke
the Act to implement desired export controls.
In 1977, however, Congress revoked the President's authority to uni-
laterally declare a national emergency in order to implement export con-
trols under the Act. 24 Congress took this action because Presidents had
extensively used emergency authority under section 5(b) of the Trading
With the Enemy Act to regulate transactions that were unrelated to a
declared state of emergency. 25 At the same time that Congress revoked
such authority, it authorized extensions of one year at a time for certain
existing controls under the Act,26 including a prohibition against the
shipment of strategic goods to &ertain countries such as the Soviet Union.
President Carter extended these controls on September 12, 1979,27 so
they are still in effect for items contained in the Commodity Control List
which the Commerce Department implements pursuant to the Export
Administration Act of 1979.28 Because Congress has repealed the au-
thority to create future export controls by declaring a national emer-
gency, the President may only implement further export controls under
the Trading With the Enemy Act during wartime. 29 Therefore, the use
of this Act to embargo transfer of technology to the Soviet Union was
precluded in the 1979 embargo.
The second group of Acts that control the export of technology are
those concerned specifically with arms control. The Neutrality Act of
1939 for a time authorized the State Department to regulate the export
of munitions.30 In 1954, however, Congress determined that this section
of the 1939 Act was unworkable due to its cumbersome detail, red tape,3 1
and the overly restrictive regulatory apparatus for presidential author-
22 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976) (amended 1977).
23 See. text .accompanying notes 65-75 inf/a. For a discussion of pre-1967 usage of the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act, see generaly Berman & Garson, supra note 20.
24 National Emergencies Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (Supp. H 1978)).
25 S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted tn [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4540, 4541. A second reason was that the National Emergencies Act of 1977 provided
safeguards for the role of Congress in declaring and terminating national emergencies. Id
26 National Emergencies Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b)-(c), 91 Stat. 1625
(1977) (codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (Supp. I 1978)).
27 44 Fed. Reg. 53153 (1979).
28 See text accompanying notes 65-75 in/a.
29 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
30 Ch. 2, § 12, 54 Stat. 4 (1939) (repealed 1954).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sass. 90 (1954); S. REP. No. 1799, 83d Cong., 2d
Sass. 79, repnntedin [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245.
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ity.3 2 Therefore, Congress repealed that section of the Neutrality Act of
1939 and instead enacted the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 33 which au-
thorized the State Department to control exports of munitions and re-
lated technology. Although this Act did not define "technology," the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Van Hee,
34
broadly construed regulations defining it to include not only blueprints
and specific information but also general knowledge and experience.
3 5
Although this broad definition flirts with being an unconstitutional prior
restraint on freedom of speech in violation of the first amendment, 36 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Elder Industries,
Inc. ,37 held that the regulations were not unconstitutional since they pro-
hibited only the export of technical data significantly and directly re-
lated to articles on the Munitions List, a list compiled by the State
Department pursuant to the Act.38 Thus, these cases have allowed the
State Department a wide latitude in controlling exports of technology
when they relate to munitions.
The Mutual Security Act of 1954 was replaced by the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976,39 and the export control provisions governing muni-
tions are now found in this Act.4° There has been little significant
change in the regulation of technology related to munitions with this
Act. Unfortunately, technology has not been further defined under the
Act;4 1 therefore, for obvious national security reasons, the broad defini-
tions discussed regarding the Mutual Security Act of 1954 will presuma-
bly apply to any technical assistance given to the Soviet Union.
Significantly, though, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 does provide
for increased coordination with other agencies which regulate exports of
technology as well as greater congressional oversight. In addition to de-
lineating the coordination of controls under the State Department with
32 See H.R. REP. No. 1925, supra note 31, at 89-90; S. REP. No. 1799, supra note 31, at 78-
79, repr'nted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3175, 3245.
33 Pub. L. No. 83-665, § 542(12), 68 Stat. 832 (1954). For background on the Mutual
Security Act of 1954, see Comment, Arms Control-Sate Department Regulation of Erports of Techmal
Data Relating to Munitions Held to Encompass General Knowledge and Experience, 9 J. INT'L L. & POL.
91, 96-98 (1976).
34 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976) (conviction for conspiracy to export technical data and
Building for Portugal an item covered by the State Department's Munitions List (amphibious
vehicle) without first having obtained an export license or written approval from the Depart-
ment).
35 531 F.2d at 357. This interpretation was highly criticized in Comment, supra note 33.
36 "The Van Hee decision may hinder the free flow of scientific ideas by raising the possi-
bility that an individual or his firm may be prosecuted if his or her general knowledge is applied
to munitions in another country." Comment, supra note 33, at 105. Set also text accompanying
notes 104-108 infa.
37 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
38 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1979). For the current list, see 15 C.F.R. § 370, Supp. No. 2 (1980).
39 Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976).as amended ly International Security Assistance
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-92 (to be codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
40 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980).
41 See d. § 2794(3)-(7).
562 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 42 and the Department of
Commerce, 43 section 211 of the Act provides for congressional veto by
concurrent resolution of proposed sales or transfers of military equipment
to non-NATO countries.
44
Regarding NATO countries and other allies, it is obvious that a
great degree of coordination is necessary in order to make the United
States' arms export restrictions and related restrictions on technology ef-
fective. "It has never been supposed that the United States could ensure
effective restrictions on the shipment of strategic goods to Communist
[and other] destinations without parallel controls exercised by other
countries, both to restrict strategic exports from those countries and to
prevent transshipments of American exports."' 45 A consultative group
was formed in 1949, and this group instituted a multilateral system of
export controls on trade and transfer of technology with the Sino-Soviet
bloc. 4 6 The day to day working group is the Coordinating Committee,
or COCOM. The members of COCOM include Japan and all the
NATO countries except Iceland. 47 This group regularly composes lists of
items for which export should be monitored, restricted, or denied. 48 The
State Department represents the U.S. interests in COCOM.
The United States institutionalized its participation in COCOM
with the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951,49 commonly
called the "Battle Act." Although participation in COCOM was the
Act's principal purpose, it also provided authority to restrict U.S. aid to
nationg that export items listed by the State Department under the Act 50
to "any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the
United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all
countries under its domination . . . . 5 Yet such sanctions, though po-
tentially applicable, were described as "too crude to be effective."'52
Therefore, the major significance of the Act was the coordination of tech-
nology and other arms controls among U.S. allies. Congress recently re-
pealed this Act and replaced it with a similar section in the Export
Administration Act of 197953 in order to simplify the maze of statutes
42 Id § 2778(a)(2).
43 Id. § 2778(e) (West Supp. 1980). The Export Administration Act of 1979 is governed
by the Commerce Department. See text accompanying notes 65-75 infia.
44 See generally 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1029 (1977).
45 Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 834. For efforts at such coordination in the recent
restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union, see text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
46 See Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 835.
47 S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1147, 1156.
48 See Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 835.
49 Pub. L. No. 82-213, 65 Stat. 644 (1951) (repealed 1979).
50 See DEP'T. OF STATE, MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951 (BATTLE
ACT) REPORTS (1952-1979).
51 Pub. L. No. 82-213, § 101, 65 Stat. 644 (1951) (repealed 1979).
52 Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 837.
53 See text accompanying notes 65-75 infia.
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relating to export controls. However, the authority for participation in
COCOM is unchanged. 54 The relevant U.S. controls on munitions are
those currently administered under the Arms Export Control Act of
1976.55
Although the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 strictly regulates the
transfer of technology relating to military equipment, the Export Control
Act of 194956 was the first legislation designed specifically to regulate
nonmilitary exports. It was described as "the first comprehensive system
of export controls ever adopted by the Congress in peacetime. Even that
Act was initially conceived as a temporary measure, and might well have
been allowed to lapse in 1951 but for the Korean War."'57 Instead, the
Export Control Act of 1949 was the primary means of regulating transfer
of technology outside the United States until 1969. Presidential authority
under the Export Control Act of 1949 was extremely broad. In 1967, a
study of export controls was of the view that:
Probably no single piece of legislation gives more power to the President
to control American commerce. Subject to only the vaguest standards of
"foreign policy" and "national security and welfare," he has authority to
cut off the entire export trade of the United States, or any part of it, or to
deny "export privileges" to any or all persons. Moreover, the procedures
for implementing this power are left almost entirely to his discretion,
and at the same time heavy administrative and criminal sanctions may
be imposed for violation of any export regulations he may introduce.
58
Furthermore, the Congress had specifically broadened the Act's potential
impact on technology transfer in 1965 by extending Presidential author-
ity to prohibit or curtail exports to cover "any other information" in ad-
dition to technical data. 59 The breadth of the statute reflects the
underlying premise of restricting virtually all trade to Communist coun-
tries prior to 1969. 60
By 1969, gradual changes in national policy had led to a loosening
of trade restrictions with Communist countries. Thus, the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949 was replaced by the less onerously named Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969.61 This Act, like the 1949 Act, was administered
54 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(i) (to be codified in 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404). See S. REP. No. 169, 96TH CONG., IST SEss. 15-16, reprintedin [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1147, 1162.
55 See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
56 Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (expired 1969).
57 Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 792.
58 Id
59 Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 210 (1965) (expired 1969). This addition was made
"in connection with the new policy provisions relating to boycotts, since controls over furnishing
of information may be deemed appropriate as a part of the regulations issued in connection
with this new policy provision." S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, rep intedin [1965] U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1826, 1832.
60 See E. PHILBIN, SOVIET TECHNOLOGY: STATUS, TRENDS AND STRATEGIES 122 (1978)
(Air War College Report No. 445).
61 Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (expired 1979). For criticisms of the Export
Control Act of 1949 and its administration, see Berman & Garson, supra note 20; Rubin, United
States Export Controls: An Immodest roposal, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1968).
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by the Secretary of Commerce by means of general and validated
licenses, 62 but was better coordinated with the State and Defense De-
partments. Congress itself exercised stricter oversight regarding the ad-
ministration of this Act than it had over the Export Control Act of 1949.
This change was due primarily to congressional concern over the secrecy
of operations, lack of formal procedural rules and enforcement powers,
and the belief that the rules were not uniformly interpreted under the
1949 Act. Erratic enforcement was detrimental to those businesses
against whom the Act was strictly applied and generally promoted inef-
fectiveness in preventing the exports of technology which were pro-
scribed by the Act.6 3 Congress thus sought to alleviate these problems in
the 1969 Act.
While the 1969 Act was in force, the original premise of restricting
exports and technology transfer solely to Communist countries was aban-
doned. It was recognized that a country need not be Communist to pose
a security threat to the United States and that some Communist coun-
tries were not so threatening as to require a sweeping prohibition of tech-
nology exports. In 1977, Congress amended the Act to broaden the scope
of its coverage and decrease its "pigeonholing" application to Commu-
nist countries. Greater emphasis was placed on identifying the technol-
ogy and commodities likely to contribute to foreign threats to U.S.
national security. 64 It is not insignificant that this change in perspective
followed a period of increasing trade with the Soviet Union, although
increased trade is only one factor explaining the change in emphasis.
In 1979, Congress allowed the 1969 Act to expire and substituted
the Export Administration Act of 1979.65 The purposes of the 1979 Act
include extending the authority of the 1969 Act and the appropriations
thereunder, improving the efficiency of export licensing that had suffered
from increasing procedural delays, providing for a systematic review and
revision of export control procedures, revising the list of goods and tech-
nology subject to export control, and fostering consistency in U.S. export
control policies and closer cooperation with allies.66 Much of the 1969
62 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 370-372 (1980). All goods and technical data with few exceptions
require general or validated licenses from the Commerce Department for export. Id. § 370.3. A
general license is a broad authorization requiring neither the filing of an application nor the
issuance of a license document. Id § 371.1. The exporter need only adhere to the regulations.
Id § 371.2. Exports to the Soviet Union require a validated license. Id § 371.2(c)(2). A vali-
dated license is a formal document issued by the Commerce Department after written applica-
tion by the exporter that authorizes exports only within the confines of the document. Id
§ 372.2.
63 See PHILBIN, supra note 60, at 123 (noting similar concerns before the 1977 amend-
ments).
64 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (expired
1979). See H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinledin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 362, 364-65.
65 Pub. L. No. 96-72 (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420).
66 S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprntted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1147, 1149.
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Act was left intact, and the authority of the regulations issued thereunder
was continued. 67 President Carter chose the authority granted by the
1979 Act to embargo high technology exports to the U.S.S.R.
The authority of the President to control exports for foreign policy
purposes is extremely broad under the 1979 Act with respect to the trig-
gering purpose. 68 Section 3(2) of the Act states that:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after full
consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and
only to the extent necessary
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its
declared international obligations .... 69
The standards are no less vague than those described in the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949. However, the 1979 Act does prescribe the specific crite-
ria that are to be considered by the President when imposing such export
controls. These criteria are: whether the controls are likely to achieve
their purpose in light of availability of goods from other countries;
whether the controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy in general
and specifically with regard to the target country; what international re-
action there might be to the controls; what impact controls would have
on U.S. exports, on the competitive position of the United States in the
international economy, on the U.S. economy in general, and on particu-
lar businesses and their employees and surrounding communities; what
the U.S. ability to enforce the controls effectively is; and what the foreign
policy consequences of not imposing controls are.70
In addition to these criteria, the Act requires a prior determination
that reasonable efforts have been taken to achieve the desired foreign
policy goal through negotiation or other alternative means. 71 It also re-
quires a notification to Congress explaining the controls, the President's
conclusions with respect to the specific criteria, alternative means at-
tempted, and how it is expected that the controls will achieve the foreign
policy purpose. 72 Finally, the Act requires prior consultation with af-
fected industries on such relevant criteria as the Secretary of Commerce
67 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 21(a) (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2420).
68 Section 6(a) of the Act provides:
AUTHORITY. (1) In order to carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (2)(B)(7),
or (8) of section 3 of this Act, the President may prohibit or curtail the exporta-
tion of any goods, technology, or other information subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign pol-
icy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations. The
authority granted by this subsection shall be exercised by the Secretary, in consul-
tation with the Secretary of State and such other departments and agencies as the
Secretary considers appropriate, and shall be implemented by means of export
licenses issued by the Secretary.
Id § 6(a) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)).
69 Id § 3 (2) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)).
70 Id § 6(b) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)).
71 Id § 6(d) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(d)).
72 Id § 6(e) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e)).
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considers appropriate 73 (which is why the embargo regulation was issued
in interim form).74 Thus, while the purposes for which the foreign policy
oriented export controls may be used are broad under the Act, the Con-
gress has defined the criteria to be considered in imposing such controls
and now requires greater justification for imposing them than under pre-
vious Acts.
To summarize, the broad policy of allowing the use of export con-
trols for foreign policy purposes has not been changed. Like the 1969
Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979 provides that it is the general
"policy of the United States to use its economic resources and trade po-
tential to further the sound growth and stability of its economy as well as
to further its national security and foreign policy objectives." 75 Yet,
Congress has progressively tightened the procedures for executive use of
authorized export controls in all areas. Under the Trading With the En-
emy Act of 1917, in the succession of Acts governing munitions controls,
and in the Export Administration Acts, Congress has systematically lim-
ited plenary executive use of export controls and has increasingly re-
quired greater justification and public participation in their use.
Congress has also been successful in coordinating the maze of authority
for export controls into fewer Acts and has thereby simplified procedures
in order to promote greater public understanding of these controls.
Congress has not been the only branch of government which has
fostered changes in export control policies. The executive branch has
made specific changes in the substantive policies for controlling exports
of high technology as well as procedural changes. The substantive poli-
cies of the executive branch in controlling exports of technology must
finally be considered in order to round out the evaluation of the em-
bargo.
The United States has a comparative advantage in most areas of
scientific technology, making the transfer of such technology valuable to
the Soviet Union. As discussed, the United States has increasingly al-
lowed the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union where it does not
have a direct military application. Most technology, however, is capable
of some military application. Therefore, "the control of exports of design
and manufacturing know-how. . . is absolutely vital to the maintenance
of U.S. technological superiority and continued comparative qualitative
73 Id § 6(c) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c)).
74 See text accompanying notes 96-98 qfra.
75 Pub. L. No, 96-72 § 3(4) (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(4)); Export
Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(4), 83 Stat. 842 (expired 1979).
That this is still the policy of the United States is significant in light of the recent trend to
separate trade policy administration from foreign policy administration so that tradeoffs be-
tween the two do not undermine the country's balance of trade. State Department authority in
trade matters has continually been transferred to other departments. See, e.g., Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1979, Consolidation of Federal Trade Functions, 125 CONG. REc. H8462, reprntted
t, [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3396.
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superiority in deployed weaponry."' 76 This concern is illustrated by an
admission of the Defense Department that a grave error was made in
allowing the sale of U.S. computers to the Soviet Union which has since
used them in the Kama River manufacturing plant to build trucks and
other military equipment for the Soviet army. 77 Clearly effective export
controls on high technology sales are necessary in order to preserve the
U.S. comparative advantage in the military arena.
Rather than prohibiting technology transfer completely, the current
goal of the Defense Department has been to maintain the leadtime re-
quired to develop new technologies.78 The Department of Defense seeks
to achieve a delay until replacement or replenishment of critical technol-
ogy is in sight. 79 For example, if it were believed at a particular instance
that the United States was five to eight years ahead of the Soviet Union
in computer technology and that it would take three years for the United
States to achieve the next technological advance, then the U.S. goal
would be to delay Soviet achievement of present U.S. capability for at
least three years. If left to their own capabilities, the Soviets would take
five to eight years to reach that point.8 0 Applying the delay strategy to
the example, the Department of Commerce would deny licenses to ex-
port the then most advanced computers to the Soviet Union until at least
three years from their development, provided that such technology was
not otherwise available to the Soviets.
In order to achieve the goal of preserving the U.S. comparative ad-
vantage by means of maintaining leadtime, the export controls have tra-
ditionally focused on the control of end products. Thus, export controls
on technology have generally been tied to specific items. The emphasis
on end products has shifted recently to controlling critical technologies8 '
themselves with a focus on controlling "revolutionary" rather than "evo-
lutionary" developments. In this way the U.S. comparative advantage
76 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE REPORT ON ExPORT OF TECHNOLOGY (1976)
(quoted in Department of Defense Policy Statement on Export Controls of United States Technology. Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Poliy and Trade of the Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977)) [hereinafter cited as Hearings before the Subcomm. on
International Economic Polcyl.
77 Trucks manufactured at the Kama River manufacturing plant have been used in the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1980, at 14, col. I. For a full congres-
sional discussion of the Kama River manufacturing plant, see 125 CONG. REc. S10126-46 (daily
ed. July 21, 1979). See also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 17, 1980, at 51-52.
78 Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy, supra note 76, at 11 (statement
of Dr. Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs).
79 E. PHILBIN, supra note 60, at 128.
80 Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Economic Poly, supra note 76, at 12 (statement
of Dr. Ruth Davis, Deputy Director for Research and Advanced Technology for the Depart-
ment of Defense).
81 DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON EXPORT OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY, AN ANAL-
''SIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY-A DoD PERSPECTIVE 27-33 (1976). The
term "critical technologies" is used to describe those technologies which are identified as strate-
gic and in need of control for a variety of reasons, most imortant of which is the relative ad-
vancement with respect to other nations.
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can be maintained in areas of important scientific breakthroughs. 82 The
Defense Department found that:
based both on information provided by the intelligence community and
industry, as well as observations of the military strengths of our adversa-
ries, there was an excessive flow of technology that needed to be con-
trolled and that the end product controls were not adequate to so stop
them.83
Therefore, the current effort is to develop methods of controlling the crit-
ical technologies themselves rather than end products and to promote
this concept into COCOM coordinated controls.
8 4
The change in emphasis has come for two major reasons. First, at
low levels of trade involving critical subsystems,8 5 there is limited ability
for the Soviets to develop efficient technological systems from them. It is
generally difficult for the Soviets to do the "reverse engineering" neces-
sary to make the most efficient use of such subsystems.8 6 The subsystems
are thus valued more for their use than for the small potential of apply-
ing the technology embodied therein to other areas. Therefore, transfer
of the technology itself poses the relatively greater threat because it can
be more directly applied to military and other uses.
Second, the greatest comparative advantage of the United States
relative to the Soviet Union is the ability to assemble, organize, and oper-
ate integrated systems of advanced technology. Transfers of entire sys-
tems of technology have the greatest impact on the Soviet Union because
it can exploit the technology to its full potential rather than struggle inef-
ficiently to assimilate critical subsystems.8 7 "The U.S.S.R. [has shown] a
preference for 'turnkey' projects, thus emphasizing their interest in pro-
curing large-scale systems of foreign technology rather than critical sub-
systems."'8  This in turn creates a need to control the critical
technologies embodied in these projects rather than the end products and
to scrutinize even more strictly large scale technology transfers.8 9 There-
82 Id at 9-14. This difference in focus is based on the view that when both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. are on the same evolutionary track in a given field, the gap narrows regardless of
export controls. Id at 12.
83 Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Economtc Polcy, supra note 76, at 18 (statement
of Dr. Frost).
84 Id. at 17.
a5 The term "critical subsystems" describes technological systems such as computers or
other items which can be integrated into an ongoing operation as opposed to an entire turnkey
system of technology such as a plant. The subsystem is the end product and does not necessarily
include the technology which makes it up.
86 H. KAHN & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 6-9 to 6-10.
87 Id at 6-8.
.88 Id at 5-6.
89 A Hudson Institute report has recommended, however, that the government should
encourage certain large scale transfers which create a heavy infrastructure burden on the Soviet
Union such that resources will be reallocated which would otherwise have military effects. The
report has suggested that by negotiating threat reduction tradeoffs and revising export controls,
the United States might develop a policy mixture that could mitigate the risks in extensive
technology transfers while maintaining a political framework for improving trade and political
relationships with the Soviet Union. Id. at 6-11 to 6-14. It is not known to what extent the
United States has consciously pursued such a policy.
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fore, with both large scale technology transfers involving turnkey projects
and also small scale transfers involving critical subsystems, the preferred
means of controlling technology exports is by controlling the transfer of
the technologies themselves.
Developing and implementing the critical technology approach is a
difficult task, however. It involves an immense reorganization of existing
export controls on technology. It also requires parallel efforts by U.S.
allies coordinated through COCOM if the approach is to be effective. At
the time the Export Administration Act of 1979 was passed, a critical
technology approach had yet to be devised and implemented, although
the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Export of Technology had
recommended it three years earlier in 1976.90 Nevertheless, President
Carter's recent embargo should enable the government to accelerate im-
plementation of this approach within the context of reassessing techno-
logical exports to the Soviet Union. Thus, an accelerated
implementation of a major change in administrative policy could be a
side benefit of the technology embargo.
The administrative strategies developed to control exports of tech-
nology to the U.S.S.R. and other countries have involved a curious mix-
ture of policies---defense, business, and politics. Recently, efforts have
been made to separate foreign policy and political influence from trade
policy9' and to define the role of defense in relation to business.92 Yet all
three elements have interlocked completely in this area. Such controls
on business for foreign policy purposes have only been strongly ques-
tioned in recent times, however. "During the 1950's and early 1960's
there was little, if any, substantial opposition to the systematic use of
export controls as a foreign policy weapon, either in Congress or in the
business community."'93 In contrast, the recent embargo has created a
great deal of opposition from the business community.94
Clearly, the political nature of technology transfer creates uncer-
tainty for the businessmen involved, but this is inevitable where large
scale trade in high technology items is so prevalent. Selling complete
systems of advanced technology to the Soviets is not a commercial deci-
sion. It is a political decision to confer an advantage that could not be
reproduced within the Soviet Union, given their existing resources and
90 S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 3, reprinted in [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1147, 1149.
91 See note 75 supra.
92 "With the advent of detente, . . . [commercial] interests have become increasingly im-
portant; consequently, strategic interest barriers have been reduced and East-West trade greatly
expanded." Hearings on S 1890 and S 3282 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 155-57 (1974) (statement of
Frederick Dent, Secretary of Commerce).
93 Berman & Carson, supra note 20, at 800. "Whatever congressional debate accompanied
the successive extensions of the Export Control Act [of 1949] was directed largely to the Admin-
istration's failure to secure a greater degree of cooperation from friendly foreign nations in the
implementation of multilateral trade controls." Id.
94 See note 6 supra.
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organizational constraints, at any time in the foreseeable future without
wrenching reallocations of resources. 95 Thus, the government must exer-
cise a more pervasive role in this area than it normally does in transfer of
technology decisions made by businesses.
It is in this perspective that one must analyze President Carter's de-
cision to revoke and discontinue the authorizations for transfer of tech-
nology under the Export Administration Act of 1979. 96 Business
interests as well as political and defense interests were considered before
the President reached his decision. This is reflected by the fact that the
Secretary of Commerce allowed for comments before the embargo regu-
lations were to become final on March 11, 1980, even though section
13(a) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 exempts regulations
promulgated under the Act from public participation in the rulemaking
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.97 Permitting this pe-
riod of public comment conformed with congressional intent as expressed
in section 13(b) of the Act.98 Yet, this embargo is a block to these busi-
ness interests, and its primary impetus is to dissuade the Soviet Union
from continuing its intervention into Afghanistan and from future such
interventions. The decision must be analyzed broadly in light of the So-
viet need for U.S. technology, the nature of U.S. export controls, and the
methods of implementing them which have been discussed.
It is clear that the Soviet Union views imports of advanced technol-
ogy from the United States and other nations as vital to modernization
of its industry. The Soviet Union has increasingly allowed and promoted
such imports as an integral part of its industrial expansion. At the same
time, the United States has gradually loosened restrictions on trade with
the Soviet Union. The efforts of Congress in the successive Acts discussed
have been aimed at assuring workable export controls that alleviate un-
necessary problems for business interests while liberalizing exports to
Communist countries and circumscribing presidential authority to re-
strict such exports. In the same vein, the executive branch has changed
from a policy of few exports to Communist countries to a policy of al-
lowing exports which do not jeopardize U.S. leadtime in the military
arena. In this perspective, the recent embargo is a retrenchment. Al-
though its prime motive was to compel the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its
troops from Afghanistan and to demonstrate the costs that will result if
similar future actions are taken, the embargo will also force the U.S. gov-
ernment to rethink its continued liberality on exports of technology to
the U.S.S.R. in view of the possibility of an impending major Soviet of-
fensive.
It must first be determined, however, whether the embargo is likely
95 H. KAHN & W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 6-9.
96 See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
97 Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 13(a) (1979) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412). See 45 Fed.
Reg. 3027-29 (1980).
98 Id § 13(b) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412).
SOVIET INTERVENTION 571
to be effective in achieving its initial purpose of compelling the Soviets to
remove their troops from Afghanistan and to halt their intervention in
that geopolitical area. It is clear that the Soviets consider the U.S. high
technology necessary to their modernization program. Therefore, even if
the embargo is not joined by other Western countries and the Japanese,
it will put a damper on these plans. Until the time of the embargo, the
United States believed it had subsidized industrial development in the
Soviet Union and had attempted to provide the Soviets with a stake in
continuing trade. 99 To the extent that this view is correct and the policy
successful, the embargo on high technology transfer should correspond-
ingly compel the Soviet Union to rethink its geopolitical strategies re-
garding Afghanistan specifically, and to reexamine its overall
relationship with the United States. If a true dependency relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union has been established
regarding technological trade, the embargo will alter planned develop-
ment in the Soviet Union and should thus cause the Soviets to consider
carefully whether their activities in Afghanistan should be curtailed. Al-
though the Soviet Union is unlikely to back down on this specific issue in
the face of the current public challenge by the United States, the Soviets
may consider these costs more carefully before taking similar actions in
the future.
This analysis does not suggest that the Soviets will decide that the
price is not worth paying. The comparative technological advantage of
the United States over the Soviet Union has clearly narrowed in the mili-
tary arena in recent years.l°° It is clear that the Soviets have been suc-
cessful in circumventing some U.S. controls on export of technology or
that such controls have not been effective in preventing military use of
authorized technology transferred.i0i Most important, however, is the
fact that those Soviet plans that the embargo will damage are long term
plans. Therefore, the detriment to the Soviet Union will only be truly
felt over the long run. This latter fact allows the Soviets to consider the
possible effect of the embargo and their potential reaction to it in a cau-
tious manner.
Given such time for the Soviets to weigh the risks and lost benefits,
they may find alternative sources for lost U.S. contracts. Firm coopera-
tion and coordination of such controls with the COCOM nations will be
the keystone of U.S. success in this particular effort. Although the
NATO countries did pledge not to undermine the embargo when it was
first announced, 10 2 this solidarity may weaken over time. On the other
hand, if others join in the embargo and it is effective in shutting off most
high technology exports to the Soviet Union, the Soviet's ultimate deci-
99 Set text accompanying note 18 supra.
100 Dee Dep't of Defense Appropriations for 1978, Hearings Before a Subcomm. ofthe House Comm. on
Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, at 183 (1977); E. PHiLBiN, supra note 60, at 22-27.
101 See text accompanying notes 77 & 83 supra.
102 See note 7 supra.
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sion to halt further intervention after Afghanistan or to continue such
action and forego trade benefits as well as risk other potential costs will
shed some light on the importance that they place on their involvement
in Afghanistan and on their priorities for the 1980s. The Soviets will be
faced with a choice of whether to continue trade with Western nations
and the strong international relations indicated by such trade1 0 3 or to
pursue more hostile endeavors.
The United States, too, is immediately faced with a choice. That
choice is how to pursue controls over technology exports to the Soviet
Union in the future. President Carter has clearly indicated a harder line
with the embargo, but this is only a short term measure. Indeed, the
United States could discontinue technology exports to the Soviet Union
indefinitely, but such a policy would only be superficial and would hurt
U.S. industry needlessly, given the fact that the Soviets can find alterna-
tive sources for at least some losses. A coordinated, multilateral effort is
the key to tightening up controls. Implementing the critical technology
approach and coordinating such an approach through COCOM will be
necessary to stabilize such controls in the future. Although the critical
technology approach is not a panacea, it should enable the United States
and COCOM nations to follow a more restrictive policy of export con-
trols if necessary given the Soviet proclivity to use transferred technology
for military ends. It appears likely that this embargo will mark a turning
point in what has been increasingly liberal trade with the U.S.S.R. be-
cause export controls on transfer of technology will be administered in
the near future under the grave light of a potential war.
There is a danger in a more restrictive approach that has only been
alluded to, however. Increasing the restrictions on technological exports
raises strong first amendment considerations. Restricting technology
transfer, especially if done via the critical technology approach, limits
freedom of speech and the dissemination of ideas, and may also, by limit-
ing the practice of one's occupation, be a deprivation of liberty without
due process. 10 4 While such restrictions may be justified when the welfare
or safety of the nation requires it and all citizens are equally affected, 10 5
[R]estrictions upon the export of technology inevitably involve a far
greater intervention by the Government in operations of business and
scientific enterprise and also raise far more acute questions of constitu-
tional freedom than do restrictions upon the export of goods. Thus the
national interest in preventing the development of the widget industry
in the Soviet Union must be weighed against the national interest in
preserving the American industry and science from excessive interfer-
ence, as well as against the national interest in freedom of international
communication. 1
0 6
103 The Soviets view trade as the barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations. See text accompany-
ing notes,15-17 supra.
104 See Comment, supra note 33, at 109.
105 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1965).
106 Berman & Garson, supra note 20, at 824.
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Although such first amendment considerations are clearly overridden by
national security interests in the field of munitions, 0 7 the more attenu-
ated the connection between the restrictions and their military nature
becomes, the greater will be the relative interest in freedom of transfer. 108
While the current embargo has a close nexus with the national se-
curity interest, the Government cannot afford to stretch the connection
too far. Foreign policy alone, divorced from the national security issue,
appears to be too vague a ground on which the Government can restrict
transfer of technology constitutionally. Although future restrictions dis-
cussed above will also have an overriding purpose of delaying improve-
ments of the Soviet military force, this constitutional limitation must be
borne in mind by both legislators and administrators in designing and
applying such restrictions. Finally, even if further restrictions are consti-
tutional, it must also be asked whether they are wise domestic policy and
whether they comport with U.S. values of scientific freedom.
In conclusion, the recent embargo on transfer of technology to the
Soviet Union is an action taken for a justified foreign policy purpose. It
will be effective at least in compelling the Soviets to rethink their position
after the Afghanistan invasion although not enough by itself to make
them withdraw from that country. The embargo will certainly indicate
to the Soviet Union that the United States will not continue to cooperate
and aid in Soviet domestic modernization efforts while the Soviet Union
pursues its aggressive international policies.
The embargo appears to mark what will be a retrenchment on the
recent policy of increased restrictions on exports of technology to the
U.S.S.R. While the critical technology method of implementing such
controls should make controls more effective if the method is imple-
mented, it will also involve a more pervasive intervention into business
and scientific operations. During times of war and similar circumstances,
exceptions to what might otherwise be a first amendment infringement
are too readily found. Therefore, this embargo should be pursued with a
careful analysis of reasons for heightened continued restrictions, the criti-
cal technological approach to export controls should be implemented,
and first amendment freedoms must be guarded rationally.
-BENJAMIN H. FLOWE, JR.
107 Set text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
108 Even if this be considered commercial speech, the government must show a justification
for suppressing speech in this context. Se In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).

